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ABSTRACT
It has generally been argued that regional trade agreements (RTAs) among developing countries
may induce potential adverse effects on trade patterns among RTA members and between them and
third countries. Using an expanded gravity model this paper estimates for a number of regional trade
arrangements among developing countries the gross trade creation and diversion effects resulting from
RTA formation. This paper brings evidence in favor of the idea that South-South RTAs, and African
RTAs in particular, are not more trade diverting than other RTAs. This evidence suggests that increased
trade with both regional partners and third countries in the case of South-South  RTAs might be
explained by the removal of “invisible” trade barriers as a result of trade facilitation measures favored
by RTA formation.
JEL classification numbers: F13, F15, C31
Keywords: regional trade agreements, gravity model, trade creation, trade diversion, African RTAsiv
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The past decade has witnessed a re-
newed interest in regional trade agreements
(RTAs), with many policymakers and academ-
ics questioning the impact RTAs have had on
members and third countries.1 A particular dis-
tinction in this debate was drawn between RTAs
involving developing countries only (South-
South RTAs) and those between developed and
developing countries (North-South RTAs). Ini-
tially, regional cooperation schemes among de-
veloping countries were also encouraged by in-
ternational organizations as a means toward
regional stability and development. In this con-
text it was also argued that regionalism could
serve as an elite-socialization process and as a
lock-in mechanism for domestic political and
economic reforms in the less developed RTA
members (Whalley, 1996).
The early theoretical and empirical work
started in the 1950s with Viner’s seminal work
(Viner 1950).2 Viner opened new ground when
he advanced the idea that the welfare effects
stemming from the formation of an RTA is am-
biguous. In a simple partial equilibrium model
under perfect competition RTA may increase
the level of trade between members at the ex-
pense of less efficient domestic producers
(trade creation) but also of more efficient third
countries (trade diversion). The net effect of
RTA on trade (as a proxy for welfare) thus de-
pends on the relative size of these two effects.
Further refinements were brought when dy-
namic effects were incorporated into this styl-
ized static approach to regional integration. The
dynamic effects resulting from regional inte-
gration usually cited are competition effects and
scale effects. These dynamic effects of regional
integration are often used to justify the forma-
tion of such trading arrangements. Both the Eu-
ropean Union project and NAFTA have been
justified on economies of scale that not only
allowed RTA members to increase their intra-
regional exports but also their trade with the
rest of the world.3 Recent multi-country com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) models in-
corporate information about levels of protec-
tion not only in RTA members but also in non-
members.  Simulations of these models ac-
counting to some extent for the overall effects
of regional integration arrangements attribut-
able to extra-regional levels of protection.
Despite these analytical advances, how-
ever, the initial Vinerian ambivalent conclusion
that RTAs could enhance or reduce welfare re-
mains.4 The issue of the net effect of RTAs on
the welfare of the member States and on the
world economy is therefore an empirical issue.
Moreover, even if there was a clear-cut ana-
lytical answer to the question of the sign of the
effects, the magnitude of these effects would
still be of interest.
The attempts to clarify empirically the
ambiguous effects of RTAs predicted theoreti-
cally have so far failed to solve the puzzle. Sev-
eral studies advanced pessimistic conclusions
about the impact of RTAs in Africa. A recent
World Bank research project on regionalism
concluded that South-South regional blocs are
problematic in several respects (World Bank
2000a). According to the World Bank study,
apart from doubtful non-economic benefits,
South-South RTAs between two or more poor
countries is very likely to generate trade diver-
sion, especially when external tariffs are high
(World Bank 2000a: 42). Similarly, Yeats
(1998) looked at detailed trade data from Sub-
Saharan Africa and concluded that, judged by
the variance in their trade patterns from what
current comparative advantage would predict,
intra-regional trade has potential adverse effects
on members and on third countries. He con-
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cludes that “preferences for African intra-trade
do not appear to have the potential to make an
important impact on these countries’ trade …
[and] they may have a negative impact on Af-
rica’s industrialization and growth if they di-
vert regional imports from low to higher cost
sources” (Yeats 1998: 116). Based on a homog-
enous goods assumption, the same conclusion
is advanced by Schiff (1997) who argues that
any RTA between small developing countries
will most likely induce a replacement of
cheaper imports from the rest of the world with
more expensive intra-RTA products from less
efficient suppliers. Arguing from a rather dif-
ferent perspective Park (1995) states that “the
smaller the intra-regional shares in total trade
... the more likely the trading blocs would be-
come trade diverting”. Given the lower intra-
trade shares of South-South RTAs (especially
African RTAs) compared to North-North or
North-South RTAs, the suggestion is once again
that South-South RTAs are potentially more
trade diverting than other RTAs. Negative im-
pacts of South-South RTAs were found or pre-
dicted not only in Africa but also in Latin
America.5
An equal amount of dissenting opinions
are put forward by other studies. For instance,
Elbadawi (1997:213) notes that “economic in-
tegration [in Africa] could generate the thresh-
old scales necessary to trigger the much-needed
strategic complementarities…within the re-
gion”. Other scholars used CGE analysis and
found that trade creation is prevalent in the case
of certain South-South RTAs. For instance
Evans (1998) and Lewis et al. (1999) found
positive net effects of regional integration ini-
tiatives in Southern Africa, while Flores (1997)
advances similar conclusions about
MERCOSUR.
This paper takes on these conclusions
and tests them empirically using an expanded
gravity model, able to identify both trade crea-
tion and trade diversion effects arising from
several RTAs. The paper is organized as fol-
lows: section 1 briefly presents the main grav-
ity model used to estimate the trade effects of
regional trade arrangements and its variants.
Section 2 explains the actual model used in this
paper. Section 3 presents the results and dis-
cusses the main findings. Section 4 proposes
an explanation for the gravity model results that
contradict the view that African RTAs are most
likely to have negative effects of both intra-
and extra-trade patterns of their members. Start-
ing from the basic theory of regional integra-
tion arrangements, it suggests a further expla-
nation based on the impact of RTAs on elimi-
nating transaction costs and non-tariff trade
barriers.3
When it comes to empirical estimates
of the RTA effects, the standard Vinerian analy-
sis is very often replaced by a variety of meth-
ods to quantify the effects of economic inte-
gration upon the volume and direction of in-
ternational trade flows. One such method is the
gravity model, which has been used widely as
a baseline model for estimating the impact of a
variety of policy issues, such as, political blocs,
patent rights, regional trading groups and vari-
ous trade distortions.6 The widespread use of
gravity equations in estimating the trade effects
arising from RTA formation is despite the fact
that initially they have tended to lack strong
theoretical bases. Most early articles using grav-
ity models were ad hoc rather than being based
on solid theoretical foundations. Exceptions to
this trend include later work by Anderson
(1979), Bergstrand (1990), Deardorff (1998),
and Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (1998).7
Typically, in the case of gravity model
of trade, bilateral trade flows are dependent
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where Xij
t are exports from country i to
country j at time t, Yi
t and Yj
t are the GDPs at
time t of country i and j, respectively. D is the
distance between the capital cities of the two
countries. The rationale behind the gravity
model is that trade is associated with economic
size, measured as GDP, and is inhibited by dis-
tance (which increases transportation costs, as
well as other transaction costs). Specifically, a
high level of income in the exporting country
indicates a high level of production, which in-
creases the availability of products for export
while a high level of income in the importing
country suggests higher demand and therefore,
higher imports. Therefore both Yi
t and Yj
t should
be positively correlated with the level of bilat-
eral exports. Since distance increases transport
costs, its coefficient is expected to be negative.
For estimation purposes, the basic grav-
ity model is most often used in its log-linear
form:
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where εij is the log normally-distributed error
term.
It is also common to expand the basic
gravity model by adding other variables, which
are thought to explain the impact of various
policy issues on trade flows. In the case of grav-
ity equations used to estimate the impact of
regional trade arrangements dummy variables
are added for each RTA under scrutiny. Fur-
thermore, in order to avoid capturing by these
dummy variables the impact of other influences
on trade, other dummy variables are added to
control for common language and common
border.8
Thus, the most commonly used version
of the expanded gravity model assessing the
impact of RTAs is the following:
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where contig, lang, RTAk are dummies for com-
mon border, common language and RTA mem-
bership. The coefficients for all these dummy
variables are expected to be positive since
neighboring countries or those sharing the same
language are assumed to trade more than non-
neighboring countries or countries having dif-
ferent languages.5
As most other studies, the model used
here estimated the log-linear form of the grav-
ity equation, using standard OLS regression
analysis. The dependent variable is total mer-
chandise exports, in log form, from country i
to country j, in a given year. The values of total
bilateral exports, expressed in current US dol-
lars, were obtained from the IMF (2000). The
model is estimated for a cross-section dataset
of more than 100 countries. The trade data
matrix has been supplemented with GDP and
GDP per capita data for three individual years:
1994, 1996, and 1998. As shown in the An-
nex, most RTAs under examination were al-
ready launched by 1994, and therefore their
impact on trade flows should be already iden-
tifiable. In addition, a separate regression was
run on a pooled data set for these years.
The GDP and population data are found
in World Bank (2000b). Both GDP and GDP
per capita are expressed in purchasing power
parity (PPP) values. PPP values are in theory
preferable since temporary shifts in exchange
rates can distort the comparability on data.9
The other variables considered are
physical distance (measured as the great circle
distance between capital cities), common bor-
ders (or contiguity), as touched upon, and lan-
guage. Physical distances are available at http:/
/www.indo.com/distance. The information on
languages and contiguity is based on CIA
(l999). All these variables are constant over the
time span used.
The variables of interest are those cap-
turing the trade effects of various RTAs. For
this, two dummies for each RTA are introduced,
as proxies for the two main trade effects – trade
creation and diversion.10 These dummies do not
capture the welfare effects associated with trade
creation and diversion, as defined by Viner
(1950), for the simple reason that the depend-
ent variable measures the bilateral export flows
and not welfare. What they capture instead are
changes in volumes of trade among RTA mem-
bers, on one hand, and between them and non-
members, on the other. The crucial factor that
links changes in export volumes with welfare
is the efficiency gains or losses associated with
this change.
The two dummy variables that have
been constructed are as follows. One of them
(INTRA_RTA) takes the value of 1 for each
observation where both countries are members
of the RTA. This dummy captures the increase
in exports from RTA members as a result of
RTA formation. The interpretation of this
dummy variable is not straightforward. Its im-
pact depends on the relative efficiency of RTA
members, compared to the efficiency of for-
eign suppliers. If the RTA is formed with the
most efficient supplier, then any increase in
intra-RTA trade should be welfare increasing
and therefore INTRA_RTA should be inter-
preted as trade creation. If, on the contrary, the
RTA is not formed with the most efficient sup-
plier then the interpretation of INTRA_RTA
depends on the extent to which intra-trade flows
substitute less-efficient domestic production or
more efficient foreign suppliers trade.
Given the lack of information on this
degree of substitution between different sup-
pliers, the increase of intra-RTA trade flows
(irrespective of whether this has been due to
substitution of domestic or foreign suppliers)
captures what Balassa (1967) has called gross
trade creation, as opposed to the Vinerian defi-
nition of net trade creation resulting from newly
created intra-RTA trade at the expense of do-
mestic suppliers. In the following discussion,
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INTRA_RTA will be interpreted as gross trade
creation, in the sense given by Balassa (1967).
Yet, as will be shown in the following discus-
sion, one can reasonably draw some conclu-
sions about net trade creation, when the two
dummy variables are jointly taken into consid-
eration.
The second dummy variable
(EXTRA_RTA) takes the value of 1 if the ex-
porter is a third country and the importer is an
RTA member. This dummy approximates the
change in exports from third countries to RTA
member as a result of RTA formation.  If there
is a decrease in exports from more efficient
third country exporters, this variable should be
interpreted as trade diversion. On the contrary,
if there is an increase in exports from third
countries as a result of RTA formation this
dummy should be interpreted as trade creation.
The two dummies can reasonably be
interpreted jointly, based on the values of
EXTRA_RTA (table 1). If total third country
exports decreased as a result of RTA forma-
tion (e.g. EXTRA_RTA < 0), it is very likely
that the increase in intra-RTA trade flows was,
to a large extent, achieved at the expense of
third country exports and therefore the gross
trade creation effect captured by INTRA_RTA
should be interpreted as a small net trade crea-
tion effect, plus a more significant trade diver-
sion effect.
Alternatively, if EXTRA_RTA > 0 as a
result of RTA formation, then it can reason-
ably be assumed that the increase in intra-RTA
trade flows comes mainly at the expense of
domestic producers and therefore INTRA_RTA
should be interpreted as a significant Vinerian
trade creation effect and a small trade diver-
sion effect.
With these specifications spelled out,
eighteen such dummy variables (nine
INTRA_RTA and nine EXTRA_RTA dum-
mies) are included in the model for the follow-
ing RTAs: AFTA, Andean Community,
Caricom, COMESA, ECOWAS, European
Union, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, SADC.
The main regression equation for the
three years single years (1994, 1996, 1998)
becomes:
exportsxm
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where all variables in lowercase are expressed in logarithmic form:
exports logarithm of exports from country X to M in year t
C intercept
gdpX
t logarithm of country’s X GDP in year t
gdpM
t logarithm of country’s M GDP in year t
gdppcX
t logarithm of country’s X GDP per capita in year t
gdppcM
t logarithm of country’s M GDP per capita in year t
dist logarithm of distance between the capital cities of X and M
CONTIG dummy variable taking the value of 1 if countries X and M share a common
border, otherwise being zero
LANG dummy variable taking the value of 1 if countries X and M share a common
language, otherwise being zero
INTRA_RTA dummy variable taking the value of 1 if countries X and M are part of the RTA,
zero otherwise
EXTRA_RTA dummy variable taking the value of 1 if country M is a member of the RTA and X
a non-member, zero otherwise. A list of RTA examined and their membership is
provided in Annex 1.
For the pooled data, two year dummies were added (Y94, Y98).7
Before discussing the empirical results,
it should be noted that the current empirical
analysis differs in three important respects from
many gravity models found in the literature.
The first stems from the way bilateral trade data
and RTA dummies were constructed. A large
majority of gravity models estimate RTA ef-
fects using total bilateral trade flows as a de-
pendent variable. However, for a given pair of
countries, with total bilateral trade one cannot
distinguish between the impact of RTA forma-
tion on exports from non-member to RTA mem-
bers from that on exports from the RTA mem-
ber to the non-member. Therefore, a constant
level for the overall bilateral trade (exports and
imports) may be the result of a reduction in
imports from non-members and an increase in
exports from RTAs to third countries. Such
trade diversion effects will not be captured
when using overall trade flows. Hence, using
bilateral exports instead of total bilateral trade
is crucial for the construction of a meaningful
EXTRA_RTA dummy, which takes the value
of 1 only on those data points registering ex-
ports from a non-member country to an RTA
member.
The second distinguishing feature is that
the analysis in this paper uses a larger number
of countries.11 Relying on a larger sample of
countries allowed for testing a larger set of
RTAs. In particular, it allowed estimating the
effects of several African RTAs whose func-
tioning was questioned in the literature. The
third advantage refers to the use of pooled data.
When the regression was performed on the
1994-1998 pooled data the equation also in-
cludes dummies for two of the three years in-
cluded in the pool, Y94 and Y98, taking the
value of 1 if trade and GDP data were from
1994 and 1998, respectively. The advantage of
pooled data is that it allows for testing explic-
itly for changes in trade patterns over time, and
to examine how these changes may have dif-
fered among various RTAs.
Dummy variable + -
INTRA_RTA Trade creation, if EXTRA_RTA>0 Trade creation
Trade diversion, if EXTRA_RTA<0
EXTRA_RTA Trade creation Trade diversion
Sign
Table 1.  Interpreting RTA dummies8
Table 2 reports the results from these
regressions, based on the specifications dis-
cussed above. The applied regression method
was the standard OLS, with White
heteroskedastic-consistent errors. While most
effects are similar to those reported by previ-
ous studies, there are some notable differences
in the trade effects of several RTAs involving
developing countries.
Results were quite robust over the
1990s, with most variables maintaining their
coefficients over time. The estimated coeffi-
cients on GDP, GDP per capita, distance, con-
tiguity and language have all the expected signs
and are highly significant in all regressions. It
is interesting to note that coefficients for ex-
porting countries of both GDP and GDP per
capita are systematically higher than the same
coefficients for importing countries.
The positive effect of GDP per capita
indicates that richer countries export more than
poor ones. However, the coefficient shows a
moderate downward trend over the 1994-1998
period from 0.76 to 0.59 for exporters and from
0.56 to 0.47 for importers. The coefficients for
distance, contiguity and language all have the
expected signs and are highly statistically sig-
nificant in all regressions. The only dummy year
that turned out statistically significant is Y98,
showing the negative impact on trade of the
1998 financial crisis. The R-square values range
from 0.6 to 0.7, denoting that 60 per cent to 70
per cent of the variation in trade flows is ex-
plained by the variables used in the model.
Quite interestingly, there is ample evidence that
South-South RTAs are less trade diverting than
theoretically predicted.12 The estimates for each
RTA are briefly discussed below.
Even though they were less in opera-
tion during the sample period than other RTAs,
AFTA trade effects were significant, both sta-
tistically and in magnitude. INTRA_AFTA is
well above unity in all years, suggesting that
AFTA countries were trading in 1996 and 1998
more than 4 times (more than 5 times in 1994)
than one would expect, given all the other grav-
ity variables.13 At the same time, imports of
AFTA countries from third countries were also
more than four times in 1994 and more than
double the level of trade between two other-
wise comparable non-AFTA countries in 1998.
One indication of these results is that even
though progress toward creating AFTA was
rather slow among ASEAN countries, there is
evidence for an outward oriented trade arrange-
ment.
Despite its early inception, the Andean
Community had lower estimates for both
INTRA_AND and EXTRA_AND than many
more recent RTAs.14 While intra-Andean trade
seemed to be more than two times higher than
trade levels between otherwise similar coun-
tries, exports from third countries were 23 per
cent to 40 per cent lower than those between
otherwise similar non-Andean members. These
results suggest that during the period examined
there was evidence of trade diversion in the
Andean region.
Similar results with regard to their sign
were found for MERCOSUR.  Statistically sig-
nificant results however were obtained only for
EXTRA_MERCOSUR dummy in 1994 and
1996 and for both dummies in the pooled data.
In the period 1994-1998, it appears that
Mercosur increased trade among members
more than two times and reduced extra-regional
imports with more than a third of their level, as
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predicted by all other gravity variables, sug-
gesting an overall trade diverting effect.15
Coefficients for EXTRA_CARICOM
were insignificant statistically throughout the
period analyzed. In contrast,
INTRA_CARICOM coefficients were highly
significant. Their values suggest that trade be-
tween CARICOM countries was 10 times
higher in 1994 and 85 times higher in 1998 than
that between otherwise similar countries in
terms of GDP, GDP per capita, distance, com-
mon language and borders.
With the exception of 1994
EXTRA_NAFTA coefficient that was statisti-
cally significant and positive, in all other re-
gressions both NAFTA dummies were statisti-
**, *, #   denote significance at the 99 per cent, 95 per cent and 90 per cent levels respectively.
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Variable 1994 1996 1998 1994-1998
C -32.2** (0.72) -34.6**(0.67) -34.5**(0.62) -32.4**(0.48)
LOG(GDPX) 1.01** (0.02) 1.04**(0.01) 1.12**(0.01) 1.03**(0.01)
LOG(GDPM) 0.82**(0.02) 0.89**(0.01) 0.88**(0.01) 0.85**(0.01)
LOG(GDPPCX) 0.76** (0.03) 0.70**(0.02) 0.59**(0.02) 0.71**(0.02)
LOG(GDPPCM) 0.56** (0.03) 0.53**(0.03) 0.47**(0.03) 0.52**(0.02)
LOG(DIST) -1.16** (0.04) -1.10**(0.03) -1.14**(0.03) -1.21**(0.02)
CONTIG 1.01** (0.15) 1.04**(0.15) 0.94**(0.14) 0.00**(0.00)
LANG 0.97** (0.08) 1.15**(0.07) 0.97**(0.06) 1.11**(0.05)
INTRA_AFTA 1.73**(0.34) 1.44**(0.33) 1.38*(0.56) 1.79**(0.17)
EXTRA_AFTA 1.42**(0.13) 1.19**(0.12) 0.87**(0.11) 1.34**(0.08)
INTRA_AND 0.70**(0.26) 0.69**(0.23) 0.97#(0.54) 0.82**(0.15)
EXTRA_AND -0.25*(0.11) -0.44**(0.11) -0.51**(0.12) -0.32**(0.08)
INTRA_CARICOM 2.34**(0.56) 3.72**(0.35) 4.41**(0.58) 2.95**(0.34)
EXTRA_CARICOM -0.01(0.16) 0.01(0.15) 0.08(0.14) -0.01(0.11)
INTRA_COMESA 1.01**(0.30) 1.15**(0.26) 0.96**(0.21) 1.13**(0.19)
EXTRA_COMESA 0.25*(0.12) 0.33**(0.10) 0.22*(0.09) 0.28**(0.07)
INTRA_ECOWAS 0.89**(0.33) 0.76*(0.33) 0.50*(0.22) 0.82**(0.21)
EXTRA_ECOWAS 0.03(0.15) 0.18#(0.11) 0.04(0.10) 0.04(0.09)
INTRA_EU 0.28**(0.09) 0.26**(0.09) 0.16(0.17) 0.23**(0.06)
EXTRA_EU 0.67**(0.09) 0.37**(0.08) 0.50**(0.07) 0.52**(0.06)
INTRA_MERCOSUR 0.35(0.37) 0.40(0.43) 0.46(0.58) 0.84**(0.23)
EXTRA_MERCOSUR -0.33*(0.13) -0.46**(0.13) -0.21#(0.12) -0.36**(0.09)
INTRA_NAFTA -0.40(0.47) -0.60(0.53) -0.72(0.82) -0.11(0.34)
EXTRA_NAFTA 0.35*(0.14) -0.11(0.12) 0.19(0.13) 0.13(0.09)
INTRA_SADC 1.65**(0.44) 2.15**(0.36) 2.17**(0.33) 2.19**(0.25)
EXTRA_SADC 0.33*(0.14) 0.41**(0.11) 0.30**(0.11) 0.40**(0.08)
Y94 -0.02(0.03)
Y98 -6.55**(0.26)
Number of included 7786 8185 8012 16269
observations Adjuster R
2 0.6 0.66 0.7 0.63
Std. error of regression 2.41 2.11 1.98 2.26
Table 2.   Gravity model results (LOG(EXPORTS) as dependent variable)10
cally insignificant. The only instance when
NAFTA shows a statistically significant coef-
ficient at a 95 per cent level (EXTRA_NAFTA
in 1994) predicts a 41 per cent increase in im-
ports of a NAFTA country from a third part-
ner, compared to what they would have been,
had the importer not belonged to NAFTA. One
explanation for these insignificant results is that
the number of observations available for
NAFTA countries compared to the entire sam-
ple is relatively small, due to its reduced mem-
bership. Other more focused studies on NAFTA
have also found that NAFTA trade effects are
mixed or insignificant, both in terms of intra-
and extra-trade (Wall 2000; Krueger 1999)16.
For the European Union, apart from the
1998 INTRA_EU coefficient, all other coeffi-
cients are statistically significant. The European
Union shows positive coefficients for both
INTRA_EU and EXTRA_EU suggesting that
the European Union was trade creating (the
European trade bloc never becoming a ‘For-
tress Europe’ during 1990s). Intra-European
Union trade effects range between 20 per cent
in 1998 and 30 per cent in 1994, while trade
with third countries increased by 40 per cent in
1996 and 100 per cent in 1994.
EXTRA_ECOWAS effects were posi-
tive but insignificant statistically (with the ex-
ception of 1996 where the coefficient was sig-
nificant at a 90 per cent level). However, with
the exception of 1998 where the estimate is
somewhat lower, in all other years two
ECOWAS countries trade two times more than
two otherwise similar non-ECOWAS countries.
Overall, there is no evidence of trade diversion.
In all years examined, trade between
COMESA members was more than two times
the hypothetical trade level predicted without
the INTRA_COMESA dummy. If an importer
was in COMESA while the exporter was in the
rest of the world, imports into COMESA mem-
bers from the third countries were on average
30 per cent higher than those predicted with-
out the trade diversion dummy variable. These
results suggest that, as in the case of other RTAs
examined, COMESA is overall trade creating.
As for SADC, both RTA effects were
significant statistically and positive in all years
examined. This suggests that in 1994 for in-
stance both intra- and extra-regional trade in-
creased five times and 40 per cent respectively.
When data was pooled the effects were almost
9 times for INTRA_SADC and 50 per cent for
extra-regional trade.17
Estimates have indicated that a signifi-
cant number of South-South RTAs were actu-
ally trade creating during the period considered.
These results are depicted in figure 1, for all
South-South RTAs considered so far. As can
be seen, all these gravity model estimates are
positive (with the exception of Andean Com-
munity and MERCOSUR) and in all cases the
overall effect is trade creation. The
INTRA_RTA effects are higher than
EXTRA_RTA effects, suggesting that through-
out the period under scrutiny intra-RTA trade
increased more than trade with non-members,
as a result of RTA formation.
These estimates, especially for African
RTAs are in stark contrast with the widespread
expectations and theoretical considerations re-
ferred to at the beginning of this paper, with
regard to the functioning of South-South RTAs.
The next section discusses several explanations
advanced for these results and suggests sev-
eral factors that may be held accountable for
these estimated effects.11
Figure 1.  South-South RTAs: Gravity Model Estimated Trade Effects






1994 1996 1998 1994-98






1994 1996 1998 1994-98






1994 1996 1998 1994-98






1994 1996 1998 1994-98






1994 1996 1998 1994-98






1994 1996 1998 1994-98







1994 1996 1998 1994-98
             INTRA_RTA             EXTRA_RTA12
One puzzling effect identified by the
gravity model used in this paper is the positive
impact of several South-South agreements, in
particular African RTAs, not only on intra-RTA
trade but also on the absolute level of trade with
the rest of the world. These findings contradict
the widespread belief that South-South RTAs
are notoriously prone to fail or end up in trade
diversion.
One element behind this opinion is Af-
rica’s pattern of protection. Trade barriers in
Africa prior to the Uruguay Round were far
more restrictive than in any of the other coun-
try groups. Sub-Saharan Africa’s tariffs aver-
aged 26.8 per cent in mid-late 1990s, which
was more than four times of the corresponding
OECD average (6.1 per cent) (Yeats, 1998;
UNCTAD, 2000). While OECD countries and
many of the fast growing exporters also made
important concessions, Africa’s trade barriers
remained significant. Such relatively high level
of MFN protection coupled with the formation
of RTAs should, according to the customs un-
ion theory, lead to trade diversion effects.
What then can explain these unexpected
gravity model estimates of gross trade creation
and diversion effects for African RTAs such as
COMESA, SADC, and ECOWAS?
Kemp and Wan (1976) offered an inter-
esting theoretical perspective on this issue.
They argued that for any proposed customs
union or free trade area there exists a set of
common external tariffs that would leave the
new trading bloc’s trade with non-member
countries unchanged, so that the welfare of the
latter countries would not be affected and any
improvement to the welfare of the integrating
countries would strictly add to world welfare.18
Whether the Kemp-Wan theorem is valid for
welfare effects or just for trade flows, the ma-
jor argument behind it is an adjustment of the
regional external tariff in such a way as to main-
tain the pre-RTA level of third country exports.
Most likely, this requires a reduction in the
MFN tariffs sufficient enough to reduce domes-
tic prices and increase consumption.  Reduc-
ing trade barriers both against RTA partners and
rest of the world in the 1990s was a common
feature of trade policies in many developing
countries, as part of the Uruguay Round and
policy advocacy from Bretton Woods institu-
tions. However, the argument that all these
South-South RTAs have found the optimal ex-
ternal tariff to avoid trade diversion remains
questionable.
What is more likely to explain the ab-
sence of trade diversion is the fact that many
of the South-South RTAs examined have not
been able to fully implement the intra-RTA tar-
iff elimination schedules proposed. This lim-
ited or lack of discrimination may explain why
trade diversion did not occur. However this
implementation failure in itself explains nei-
ther the increase in imports from third coun-
tries nor the increase in intra-regional trade.
An alternative explanation suggests that
private sector adjustments in terms of trade
reorientation are made in anticipation of re-
gional trade agreements taking place. Winters
(1984) for instance finds strong anticipatory
effects in the case of Britain joining the Euro-
pean Union in 1972. Despite the importance
of anticipatory effects of regional trade arrange-
ments on trade and capital flows, empirical
evidence that they are important in practice re-
mains in short supply. Kreinin and Plummer
(2000) for instance find no anticipatory effects
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from the announcement of AFTA formation in
ASEAN countries. Given the fragility of the
policy environment in Africa, anticipatory ef-
fects that explain the increase in intra-regional
trade as a result of announced but not fully
implemented RTAs are unlikely.
That South-South RTAs faced imple-
mentation problems and delays in liberalizing
intra-regional trade can hardly be contested.
The gravity model estimates however suggest
that the formation of these RTAs nevertheless
removed certain trade barriers. In the absence
of major tariff preferences, it results that South-
South RTAs managed to remove some ‘invis-
ible’ trade barriers. Trading across international
borders encounters many other costs, apart from
tariffs. First of all, international trade involves
non-negligible transport costs. Border formali-
ties, technical or health standards and all the
measures that are captured by what is referred
to as “trade facilitation” measures may also
impose significant costs.19 All these ‘invisible’
cost-increasing elements may all be reduced
through the formation of a South-South RTA.
As pointed out in Baldwin (1994), eliminating
such trade barriers implies no welfare loss since
there are no tariff revenues forgone.
Another form of “trade facilitation” ef-
fect of RTA formation in the case of African
RTAs is put forward by Glenday (1997). He
argues that in theory RTAs can strengthen in-
tra-regional cooperation among African coun-
tries to promote intra-regional trade and to al-
low more efficient border controls through shar-
ing of import documents, common control sys-
tem, and should make corruption and fraud and
red tape more difficult.
Yet, in reality the effect can be signifi-
cantly different. Taking into account that many
African countries have notoriously porous bor-
ders with low levels of enforceability, the es-
tablishment of a regional free trade area (com-
bined with relatively high external tariffs) ex-
acerbates the incentives for export and transit
frauds. Such frauds become simpler through
intra-regional exports when import duties on
intra-regional trade are removed, and border
controls on intra-regional trade are relaxed.
Thus, RTA formation through these informal
channels may reduce trade barriers, with posi-
tive effects on both intra- and extra-regional
trade.
While these arguments assists in under-
standing the estimated results, two additional
questions are raised by this explanation based
on “invisible” trade costs. Firstly, can RTAs be
held accountable for this outcome? Secondly,
do RTAs eliminate these trade barriers in a dis-
criminatory manner, so as to explain the wedge
between gross trade creation and diversion es-
timates?
The answer to the first question can
be found in the objectives of most South-South
RTAs. Most of these trading arrangements in-
volved regional cooperation in a number of
areas with direct relevance for trade patterns:
upgrading transport and communication, infra-
structure, harmonization and simplification of
custom procedures, trade facilitation measures
for transit goods, etc. Such objectives and con-
crete initiatives have been carried out, more or
less successfully by many of the South-South
RTAs.20
With regard to the second question,
whether the elimination of such ‘invisible’ trade
costs induces discrimination between RTA
members and third countries is less straight-
forward. One can easily distinguish the com-
plex set of regional initiatives aimed at foster-
ing trade in discriminatory and non-discrimi-
natory policies. Given the weak implementa-
tion record of most South-South RTAs, after
their formation very few tariffs will be elimi-
nated on intra-RTA trade. Yet, the RTA forma-
tion will reduce some of the non-tariff  barriers
on both intra-RTA trade and third country ex-
ports to the region. One can imagine a number
of other costs that affect differently intra- and
extra-regional exports, whose removal will in-
troduce an implicit differentiation in total trade
costs. The overall effect will be a slightly larger
reduction of trade barriers on intra-RTA trade14
(both tariff and non-tariff reduction) compared
to non-members (only some ‘invisible’ non-
tariff barriers reduced). Once these effects are
taken into account, one can more easily under-
stand the “puzzling” results of African RTAs
showing little evidence of trade diversion.15
This paper investigated the potential
impact of  South-South RTAs on both intra-
and extra-trade flows. For this purpose an ex-
panded gravity model was used to estimate the
impact of nine RTAs (of which seven among
developing countries) on trade patterns among
members and between members and non-mem-
bers. A particular emphasis was given to the
estimation of gross trade creation and trade di-
version effects, resulting from the creation of
these RTAs.
Two issues deserving further research
have been highlighted by this paper as critical
for our understanding of the impact of South-
South RTAs. Firstly, the empirical analysis un-
dertaken in this paper indicates that, unlike
widespread opinions and standard theoretical
predictions, a large number of African RTAs
are not trade diverting but trade creating, both
with regard to intra- and extra-RTA trade. Sec-
ondly, this paper argued that the explanation
for these apparently puzzling results is to be
found in the reduction of “invisible” trade bar-
riers that hampered trade with both RTA mem-
bers and third countries. Hence one major con-
clusion stemming from this paper is that fur-
ther research is needed to evaluate the extent
to which regional trade agreements among
neighboring countries are technically necessary
to eliminate these “invisible” trade barriers
mentioned in this paper. The more this is so,
the stronger the argument that regional trade
agreements are fully justified if members act-
ing together can reduce not only tariffs but also
their overall trade barriers through trade facili-
tation measures.
VI.    CONCLUSIONSAnnex 1. RTA membership
AFTA Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pilippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
Andean Community Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela
CARICOM Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, 
Suriname, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago COMESA Angola, Burundi, Comoros, D. R. Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Zambia ECOWAS Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania (withdrawn in 1999), Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Togo, Guinea-Bissau EU Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Sweden, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Netherlands, Denmark, UK, Italy, Ireland, Finland
MERCOSUR Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay
NAFTA USA, Canada, Mexico
SADC Angola, Botswana,  D. R. Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe17
1 For a review of the recent work on regional
trade agreements and their welfare effects
see for instance Pomfret (1997) and DeRosa
(1998) .
2 See for instance Viner’s and Meade’s pio-
neering work in 1950s on free trade areas
and customs unions (Viner, 1950; Meade,
1955), which has been further elaborated,
among others, by Lipsey (1960), Johnson
(1965) and Balassa(1975). For a review of
early empirical measurements of trade crea-
tion and diversion effects see for instance
Corden (1975).
3 Owen (1983) for instance estimated empiri-
cally significant scale effects for some manu-
facturing sectors as a result of EU integra-
tion.
4 Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and
Panagariya (1996) argue more plainly that
RTAs will likely reduce welfare in member
States and impede multilateral trade liber-
alization. Because RTAs give preferential
treatment to member States, they divert trade
from non-member, least-cost suppliers. They
argue that this trade diversion is likely to
dominate trade creation, so the RTA will
reduce welfare in member States.
5 See for instance the debate on the trade ef-
fects of MERCOSUR in Yeats (1997) and
Nagarajan (1998).
6 Apart from international trade flows, grav-
ity models have achieved empirical success
in explaining various types of inter-regional
and international flows, including capital
flows and labor migration (Vandekamp
1977).
7 See also Evenett and Keller (1998) who,
along with Deardorff (1998), evaluate the
usefulness of gravity models in testing al-
ternative theoretical models of trade.
8 Apart from these dummy variables, other ex-
ogenous regressors used are dummies for
wars, conflicts, natural catastrophes, etc.
Krueger (1999) also includes a dummy for
remoteness to take into account the fact that
some countries are further away from most
of their trading partners than other countries.
9 It should be noted however that, as
Sirnivasan (1995) pointed out, PPP values
are subject to significant measurement er-
rors. Yet, the risk of significant alterations
of the regression estimates is small, as evi-
denced by Linemann (1966) and Frankel
(1997).
10 A similar approach in constructing RTA
dummy variables is followed by Krueger
(1999). However, the dummy variables are
given a slightly different interpretation.
Endoh (1999) uses three dummy variables
to capture apart from trade creation, import
trade diversion and export trade diversion.
Export trade diversion is defined as an in-
crease in intra-RTA exports, at the expense
of exports from RTA members to third coun-
tries. However, the usefulness of this third
variable and its relationship with the other
two is still a matter of debate.
11 The 1994 and 1996 regressions are based
on a trade matrix covering 104 exporting
countries and 108 importing countries. This
gives a number of 7,787 data points for 1994
and 8,186 for 1996, after omitting the pairs
with zero trade. The 1998 and the 1994-1998
pooled data regressions are based on exports
from 144 countries to 151 countries, result-
ing in 12,841 data points in 1998 and 28,811
data points for the pooled data.
NOTES18
12 These findings are comparable with other
gravity model estimates. Soloaga and Win-
ters (1998), for instance, look at a wide range
of RTAs and found little evidence of wide-
spread trade diversion.
13 All the subsequent estimates of the impact
of dummies on bilateral exports discussed
in the following pages are based on an ex-
ponential transformation of the gravity
model coefficients reported in table 2. For
example, in the case of AFTA in 1994 the
estimated effect of INTRA_AFTA is
exp(1.73)=5.6.
14 Other authors found weaker results for the
Andean group in earlier periods. Frankel
(1997) for instance found negative and in-
significant trade creation coefficients for
1960s and 1970s and positive trade creation
in 1992.
15 Amjadi and Winters (1997) look into more
detail on MERCOSUR’s trade trying to ex-
plain the trade diversion as a way to save on
transportation costs facing exports by mem-
ber countries They investigate whether
transportation costs between MERCOSUR
countries and non-member countries (rep-
resented by the United States) are suffi-
ciently high to afford significant gains to
MERCOSUR countries under their new cus-
toms union. They found that transportation
costs for exports destined for countries out-
side MERCOSUR were appreciably higher
than intra-regional transportation costs.
However, they concluded that the margin be-
tween the two costs is not sufficiently large
to result in a net welfare gain for
MERCOSUR countries.
16 Using a gravity model, Gould (1998) for in-
stance found that unlike the United States-
Mexico bilateral trade flows, the impact of
NAFTA on Canada’s trade with the United
States and Mexico did not have perceptible
effects. Also, Krueger (1999) concluded that
NAFTA does not have a significant impact
on North American trade flows, in addition
to other changes in trade policies.
17 Coe and Hoffmaister (1998) also found that
the average African country actually tends
to ‘overtrade’ with third countries, when
controlling access to the sea, composition
of exports, and other factors.
18 Winters (1997) has objected to such inter-
pretations of the Kemp-Wan theorem. He
argues that the welfare of non-member coun-
tries is not monotonically related to their ex-
ports to member countries. Instead of look-
ing at third-country export levels, a better
welfare indicator for non-member countries
would be, for instance, changes in their im-
ports and changes in their terms of trade.
This argument lies on the assumption that
individuals fundamentally derive enjoyment
from consuming rather than producing
goods.
19 Hoekman and Konan (1999) found compel-
ling evidence of such “invisible” costs.
Thus, according to them, only redundant
testing and idiosyncratic standards alone
imposed extra-costs from 5 per cent to 90
per cent of the value of traded goods.
20 For a detailed analysis of various trade fa-
cilitation initiatives taken within various re-
gional integration schemes among develop-
ing countries, see UNCTAD (1996).19
Amjadi, A. and A. Winters (1999). “Transport Costs and ‘Natural’ Integration in Mercosur”, Jour-
nal of Economic Integration.14 (4): 497-521.
Anderson, J. (1979). “A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation”, American Economic
Review. 69(1): 106-16.
Balassa, B. (1967). “Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market”, The
Economic Journal. 77(305):1-21.
____________ (1975). European Economic Integration. Amsterdam:North Holland.
Baldwin, R. (1994).  Towards An Integrated Europe, London: Centre for Economic Policy Re-
search.
Baldwin, Richard E. (1997).  “The Causes of Regionalism”, CEPR Discussion Paper no. 1599,
London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Bhagwati, J. (1993). Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, in Regional Integration and
the Global Trading System, (eds.) K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, London: Harvester-
Wheatsheaf.
Bhagwati J. and A. Panagariya (1996). The Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements, Washing-
ton: AEI Press.
Bergstrand J. (1990).  The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuleson Model, the Linder Hypothesis and the
Determinants of Bilateral Intra-Industry Trade, Economic Journal, 100: 1216-29.
Bhagwati, J. (1993). “Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview”, in de Melo, J. and A.
Panagariya, eds., New Dimensions in Regional Integration, London: Centre for Economic
Policy Research.
CIA (1999). World Factbook, Washington: Central Intelligence Agency.
Coe, D.T. and A. Hoffmaister (1998).  “North-South Trade: Is Africa Unusual?”, IMF Working
Paper WP/98/94, Washington: International Monetary Fund.
Corden, W.M. (1975).  “The costs and consequences of protection: A survey of empirical work”, in
P.B. Kenen, ed., International Trade and Finance: Frontiers for Research, pp. 51-91, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Deardorff, A. (1998). “Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a Neoclassical
REFERENCES20
World?”, in J. A. Frankel, ed., The Regionalization of the World Economy, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
DeRosa, D. (1998).  Regional Integration Agreements: Static Economic Theory, Quantitative Find-
ings, and Policy Guidelines, World Bank, mimeo.
Elbadawi, I. (1997). “The Impact of Regional Trade and Monetary Schemes on Intra-Sub-Saharan
Africa Trade”, in Ademola, O., I. Elbadawi and P. Collier, eds., Regional Integration and
Trade Liberalisation in Sub-saharan Africa, Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, London.
Endoh, M. (1999). “Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the EEC, the LAFTA and the CMEA:
1960-1994”, Applied Economics, 31:207-216.
Evans, D. (1998).  Options for Regional Integration in Southern Africa, IDS Working Paper 94,
Sussex: Institute of Development Studies.
Evenett, S and W. W. Keller (1998). On Theories Explaining the Success of the Gravity Equation,
NBER Working Paper 6529, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Feenstra, R., J.A. Markusen and A. Rose (1998). Understanding the Home Market Effect and the
Gravity Equation: The Role of Differentiating Goods, NBER Working Paper No.W6804.
New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Flores, R. Jr. (1997). The Gains from MERCOSUL: A General Equilibrium, Imperfect Competi-
tion Evaluation, Journal of Policy Modeling. 19(1): 1-18.
Frankel, J.A. (1997). Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System, Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics.
Glenday, G. (1997). Customs and Trade Facilitation: Challenges and Opportunities in Sub-Saharan
Africa, Development Discussion Paper No. 616, Harvard Institute for International Develop-
ment.
Gould, D. (1998).  “Has NAFTA Changed North America Free Trade”. Economic Review 1st Quar-
ter, Dallas: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Hoekman, B. and D. E. Konan. (1999). Deep Integration, Nondiscrimination, and Euro-Mediterra-
nean Free Trade, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 2130, Washington: World
Bank.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2000). Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2000. Washing-
ton: IMF.
Johnson, H.G. (1965). An Economic Theory of Protectionism Tariff Bargaining and the Formation
of Customs Unions, Journal of Political Economy, 73: 256-283.
Kemp, M.C. and H. Wan (1976). “An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs
unions”, Journal of International Economics, 6: 95-8.21
Kreinin, M. and M. G. Plummer (2000). “Anticipatory Effects of Regional Integration: The Case of
ASEAN”, Global Economy Quarterly, 1(1):97-112.
Krueger, A. O. (1999). Trade Creation and Trade Diversion under NAFTA, NBER Working Paper
No. 7429 (December), New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lewis, J. D., S. Robinson and K. Thierfelder (1999). “After the Negotiations: Assessing the Impact
of Free Trade Agreements in Southern Africa”, TMD Discussion Paper. Washington: Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute.
Linnemann, H. (1966). An Econometric Study of International Trade Flows, Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
Lipsey, R. (1960). “The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Equilibrium Analysis”, Economic
Journal, 70: 496-513.
Meade, J.E. (1955).  The Theory of Customs Unions, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Nagarajan, N. (1998). “On the Evidence for Trade Diversion in MERCOSUR”, Integration & Trade,
Vol. 2 (6): 3-30.
Owen, N. (1983). Economies of Scale, Competitiveness, and Trade Patterns Within the European
Community, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Panagariya, A. (1996). “The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Good for Latin America?”, The
World Economy, Vol. 19(5): 485 - 516.
Park, J. H. (1995). “The New Regionalism and Third World Development”, Journal of Developing
Societies, XI (1): 21-35.
Pomfret, R. (1997). The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schiff, Maurice (1997).  “Small is beautiful: Preferential trade agreements and the impact of coun-
try size, market share, and smuggling”, Journal of Economic Integration, 12: 359–87.
Sirnivasan, T. N. (1995). “Long-run growth theories: Anything new?”, in Takatoshi, I. and A. Krueger,
eds., Growth Theories in the Light of the East Asian Experience, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Soloaga, I. and A. Winters (1998). Regionalism in the Nineties: What Effect on Trade?, CEPR
Discussion Paper Series no. 2183, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (1996). Handbook of Eco-
nomic Integration and Cooperation Groupings of Developing Countries, Vol. 1, New York
and Geneva: United Nations.
____________ (2000).  Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) Database, Spring 2001,
Version 8.0, Geneva: UNCTAD.22
Vanderkamp, John (1977). “The Gravity Model and Migration Behavior: An Economic Interpreta-
tion”, Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 4 (2), pp. 90-102.
Viner, J. (1950). The Customs Union Issue, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.
Wall, H. J. (2000). NAFTA and the Geography of North American Trade, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis Working Paper, April.
Whalley, J. (1996). “Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?”, in J. A. Frankel, ed.,
The Regionalization of the World Economy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Winters, A. (1984). “British Imports of Manufactures and the Common Market”, Oxford Economic
Papers, 36:103-18.
Winters, A. (1997).  “Regionalism and the rest of the world: The irrelevance of the Kemp-Wan
theorem”, Oxford Economic Papers, 49(2): 228-234.
World Bank (2000a). Trade Blocs, New York: Oxford University Press.
____________ (2000b). World Development Indicators (on CD-ROM), Washington: World Bank.
Yeats, A. (1997). “Does Mercosur’s Trade Performance Raise Concerns about the Effects of Re-
gional Trade Agreements?”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1729, Wash-
ington: World Bank
Yeats, A. (1998). What can be expected from African Regional Trade Arrangements? Some Em-
pirical Evidence, World Bank, mimeo.23
UNCTAD Study Series on
POLICY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND COMMODITIES
No. 1 Erich Supper, Is there effectively a level playing field for developing country
exports?, 2001.
No. 2 Arvind Pangariya, E-commerce, WTO and developing countries, 2000.
No. 3 Joseph Francois, Assessing the results of general equilibrium studies of multi-
lateral trade negotiations, 2000.
No. 4 John Whalley, What can the developing countries infer from the Uruguay
Round models for future negotiations?, 2000.
No. 5 Susan Teltscher, Tariffs, taxes and electronic commerce: Revenue implications
for developing countries, 2000.
No. 6 Bijit Bora, Peter J. Lloyd, Mari Pangestu, Industrial policy and the WTO, 2000.
No. 7 Emilio J. Medina-Smith, Is the export-led growth hypothesis valid for develop-
ing countries?  A case study of Costa Rica, 2001.
No. 8 Christopher Findlay, Service sector reform and development strategies: Issues
and research priorities, 2001.
No. 9 Inge Nora Neufeld, Anti-dumping and countervailing procedures – Use or
abuse?  Implications for developing countries, 2001.
No. 10 Robert Scollay, Regional trade agreements and developing countries: The case
of the Pacific Islands’ proposed free trade agreement, 2001.
No. 11 Robert Scollay and John Gilbert, An integrated approach to agricultural trade
and development issues: Exploring the welfare and distribution issues, 2001.
No. 12 Marc Bacchetta and Bijit Bora, Post-Uruguay round market access barriers for
industrial products, 2001.
No. 13 Bijit Bora and Inge Nora Neufeld, Tariffs and the East Asian financial crisis,
2001.
No. 14 Bijit Bora, Lucian Cernat, Alessandro Turrini, Duty and Quota-Free Access for
LDCs: Further Evidence from CGE Modelling, 2001.
No. 15 Bijit Bora, John Gilbert, Robert Scollay, Assessing regional trading arrange-
ments in the Asia-Pacific, 2001.24
No. 16 Lucian Cernat, Assessing regional trade arrangements: Are South-South RTAs
more trade diverting?, 2001.